Abstract. In various situations decision makers face experts that may provide conflicting advice. This advice may be in the form of probabilistic forecasts over critical future events. We consider a setting where the two forecasters provide their advice repeatedly and ask whether the decision maker can learn to compare and rank the two forecasters based on past performance. We take an axiomatic approach and propose three natural axioms that a comparison test should comply with. We propose a test that complies with our axioms. Perhaps, not surprisingly, this test is closely related to the likelihood ratio of the two forecasts over the realized sequence of events. More surprisingly, this test is essentially unique. Using results on the rate of convergence of supermartingales we show that whenever the two experts' advice are sufficiently distinct the proposed test will detect the informed expert in any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time.
Introduction
Consider an individual who repeatedly consults two weather forecasting websites. It is reasonable to ask what should the individual do when the two forecasts repeatedly contradict. In what way can the individual rank the two? Should the individual trust one site and (eventually) ignore the other?
The weather example above serves as a metaphor for a plethora of settings where a decision maker faces conflicting expert advice. Take for example an elected official who must rely on professional input from civil servants, a patient who receives prognosis from various doctors, or, more abstractly, a learning algorithm mechanism that uses input from various sources.
In this paper we set the stage for defining the notion of a cardinal comparison test. The setting we have in mind is a sequential one. At each stage two forecasters provide a probability over some future event (e.g., the occurrence of rain) and then the event is either realized or its complement is. Before the next day's forecasts the test must rank the two forecasters. We calibrate these ranks so they add up to one. One way to think of the test is to assume that one of the experts has the correct model. In such a case the test will surely not point at the second expert as the superior one.
Reasonable -Let us consider an event, A, that has positive probability according to the first expert but relatively small probability according to the second. Conditional on the occurrence of the event A, a reasonable test must assign positive probability to the first expert being better informed than the second.
One thing to emphasize about the comparison test we pursue and the related properties is that they are not designed to evaluate whether any of the two forecasters is correct in some objective sense. They are only designed to compare the two. To make this point assume that Nature follows a fair coin for deciding on rain and one forecaster insists on forecasting rain with probability 60% while the other insists on 10%. While both are wrong, a comparison test should somehow gravitate towards the former one as being better.
There is a large body of literature on expert testing that studies the question of whether a self-proclaimed expert is a true expert or a charlatan (see Section 1.2 for more details) and many of the results point to the difficulty or impossibility of designing such tests that are immune to strategic forecasters.
A comparison test may often be a more natural question than the one on whether the forecaster is correct.
Indeed, when a decision maker must act then he must choose which of the experts to follow. In the case of a single expert the dismissal of that expert leaves the decision maker working with her own unsubstantiated beliefs, which may lead to an even worse outcome. In case a decision maker faces two forecasters with conflicting input he may choose to somehow aggregate the two instead of dismissing one or the other. We discuss this alternative line of research in Section 1.2.
Results
Given an ordered pair of forecasters, f and g, at any finite time t we consider the corresponding likelihood ratio of the actual outcome and calibrate it so that it and its inverse add up to one. We call this the finite derivative test at time t. We prove that this test is anonymous, error-free and reasonable. Furthermore, module an equivalence relation, it is unique. In fact, for any test that differs from the aforementioned construction and which is anonymous and reasonable there exist two forecasters which render the test not error-free.
More over, our constructed test perfectly identifies the correct forecaster whenever the two measures induced by the forecasters are mutually singular with respect to each other. Requiring the test to identify the correct expert when the measures are not mutually singular is shown to be impossible.
A test could potentially take a long while until it converges to a verdict on the better expert. We show that the proposed comparison test converges fast and uniformly. In fact, when disregarding the stages at which the two experts provide similar forecasts, then with high probability the correct verdict will emerge in finite time that is independent of the underlying probabilities.
One can ask whether ideal tests can exist, that is tests that always rank the correct forecaster higher regardless of what forecasting strategies other experts might submit. Unfortunately, this turns out to be impossible, as we discuss in Appendix A. Since an ideal test does not exist, it is natural to explore the ideality of a test over a limited class of data generating processes. We provide a full characterization for the existence of ideal tests over sets by showing that an ideal test with respect to a set A exists if and only if, A is a pairwise mutually singular.
Related literature
Single expert testing. A substantial part of the literature on expert testing focuses on the single expert setting.
This literature dates back to the seminal paper of (Dawid, 1982) , who proposes the calibration test as a means to evaluate a forecaster (in particular a weather forecaster) and shows that a true expert will never fail this test. (Foster and Vohra, 1998) show how a charlatan, who has no knowledge of the weather, can produce forecasts which are always calibrated. The basic ingredient that allows the charlatan to fool the test is the use of random forecasts. (Lehrer, 2001 ) and extend this observation to a broader class of calibrationlike tests. Finally, (Sandroni, 2003) shows that there exists no error-free test that is immune to such random charlatans (see also extensions of Sandroni's result in (Shmaya, 2008) and (Olszewski and Sandroni, 2008) .
To circumvent the negative results various authors suggest to limit the set of models for which the test must be error-free (e.g., (Al-Najjar et al., 2010) and (Pomatto, 2016) ), or to limit the computational power associated with the charlatan (e.g., (Fortnow and Vohra, 2009)) or to replace measure theoretic implausibility with topological implausibility by resorting to the notion of category one sets (e.g., (Dekel and Feinberg, 2006) ).
Multiple expert testing.
Comparing performance of two (or more) experts gained very little attention in the literature. Apart from our previous work we are only familiar with (Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2008) . That paper proposes a test based on the likelihood ratio for comparing two experts. They show that if one expert knows the true process whereas the other is uninformed, then one of the following must occur: either, the test correctly identifies the informed expert, or the forecasts made by the uninformed expert are close to those made by the informed one. It turns out that the test they propose is anonymous and reasonable but is not error-free (please refer to Section 5 for the formal definition).
Another approach, was suggested by (Feinberg and Stewart, 2008) , who study an infinite-horizon model of testing multiple experts, using a cross-calibration test. In their test N experts are tested simultaneously; each expert is tested according to a calibration restricted to dates where not only does the expert have a fixed forecast but the other experts also have a fixed forecast, possibly with different values. That is to say, where the calibration test checks the empirical frequency of observed outcomes conditional on each forecast, the crosscalibration test checks the empirical frequency of observed outcomes conditional on each profile of forecasts (please refer to Appendix C for the formal definition).
They showed that if an expert predicts according to the data-generating process, the expert is guaranteed to pass the cross-calibration test with probability 1, no matter what strategies the other experts use. In addition, they prove that in the presence of an informed expert, the subset of data-generating processes under which an ignorant expert (a charlatan) will pass the cross-calibration test with positive probability, is topologically "small".
In a previous paper, (Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017) , we construct a comparison test over the infinitehorizon. In that paper the test outputs one verdict at the end of all times which is one of three forms -either it points to one of the forecasters as advantageous or it is indecisive. The main result in that paper was the identification of an essentially unique infinite-horizon ordinal test that adheres with some natural properties.
The properties studied in the current paper are inspired by the ones studies in (Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017) . The test we identify is based on the likelihood ratio. Interestingly, the tests identified in (Al-Najjar et al., 2010) and that identified by (Pomatto, 2016) for testable paradigms are also based on the likelihood ratio.
An alternative approach to that of comparing and ranking experts is that of aggregating forecasts by a non-Bayesian aggregator. For aggregation schemes that do well in a single stage setting see (Arieli et al., 2018) as well as (Levy and Razin, 2018a) , and (Levy and Razin, 2018b) , and for schemes that work well in a repeated setting and produce small regret see the rich literature in machine learning surveyed in (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) .
Model
At the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, . . . an outcome, ω t , drawn randomly by Nature from the set Ω = {0, 1}, is realized.
1 A realization is an infinite sequence of outcomes, ω := {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . .} ∈ Ω ∞ . We denote by ω t := {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω t } to be the prefix of length t of ω (sometimes referred to as the partial history of outcomes up to period t) and use the convention that ω 0 := . At the risk of abusing notation we will also use ω t to denote the cylinder set {ω ∈ Ω ∞ :ω t = ω t }. In other words, ω t will also denote the set of realizations which share a common prefix of length t. For any t we denote by g t the σ-algebra on Ω ∞ generated by the cylinder sets ω t and let g ∞ := σ( ∞ t=0 g t ) denote the smallest σ-algebra which consists of all cylinders (also known as the Borel σ-algebra). Let ∆(Ω ∞ ) be the set of all probability measures defined over the measurable space (Ω ∞ , g ∞ ).
Before ω t is realized, two self-proclaimed experts (sometimes referred to as forecasters) simultaneously announce their forecast in the form of a probability distribution over Ω.
t be the set of all sequences composed of realizations and pairs of forecasts made up to time t and let
be the set of all such finite sequences.
A (pure) forecasting strategy f is a function that maps finite histories to a probability distribution over Ω.
Note that each forecast provided by one expert may depend, inter alia, on those provided by the other expert in previous stages. Let F denote the set of all forecasting strategies. Hereinafter we will typically use f , g to denote forecasting strategies and by f to denote a pair of forecasting strategies. Namely, typically f = ( f , g).
A probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω ∞ ) naturally induces a corresponding forecasting strategy, denoted f P , that satisfies for all ω ∈ Ω ∞ and for all t such that P(ω t ) > 0,
In the other direction, a realization ω, and an ordered pair of forecasting strategies, f , induce a unique
Hence, in turn, f induces a pair of probability measures, denoted for simplicity by ( f , g), over Ω ∞ , as follows:
By Kolomogorov's extension theorem the above is sufficient in order to derive the whole measure. Observe that a pair of forecasting strategies induces a pair of probability measures, whereas each single forecasting strategy does not induce a single measure due to the dependency between the two forecasters.
A cardinal comparison test
At each stage, t, a third party (the 'tester') who observes the forecasts and outcomes compares the performance of both forecasters and decides who she thinks is better. Formally,
In words, for any t and any realization ω and any ordered pair of forecasting strategies f := ( f , g), the tester, conditional on the induced t -history observed so far, announces his level of confidence that the first forecaster (the one using f ) is better than the second one (we will interchangeably refer to this as his propensity that f is superior to g). Note that announcing 0.5 means that both are equally capable (this should not be confused with the statement that they are both capable or both incapable). Whenever T t (ω, f ) = 1 (respectively, 0) the tester is confident that f outperforms g (respectively, g outperforms f ).
Definition 2. T is called anonymous if for all
In words, the test's propensity at each period should not depend on the expert's identity. Note that whenever
For a given test T, an ordered pair of forecasting strategies f = ( f , g), and a realization ω we denote by
, be the set of realizations for which the limit of T exists and from some time on assigns a propensity larger than ε to f
Notice that the following is a straightforward observation derived from Definition 2; If T is an anonymous test then ω ∈ R ( f ,g)
T,1−ε , we use the last for some of our proofs.
When ω is in L f T,ε and ε > 0.5 the test eventually assigns a higher propensity to f than to g. On the other hand, for ε < 0.5 the test assigns a higher propensity to g whenever ω is in R f T,ε . Thus, we will typically focus on the sets L f T,ε with ε > 0.5 and on the sets R f T,ε for ε < 0.5.
Desirable Properties
In this section we introduce a set of axioms we deem desirable for a cardinal comparison test. Our first property asserts that any set that is contained in R f T,ε must not be assigned a high probability according to f in comparison with the probability assigned by g. In particular the ratio of this probabilities must be bounded by
In words, the probability ratio assigned to the set A ∩ R f T,ε according to the two forecasters should reflect the propensity ratio assigned to them by the test. Note, in particular, as ε approaches zero the set R f T,ε captures the paths where g is clearly deemed better than f and so the property of error-freeness implies that although g may assign a subset of R f T,ε a positive probability, it must be the case that f must assign it near-zero probability. On the other hand, whenever ε approaches 0.5 the corresponding ratio approaches 1 and so error-freeness requires that f assigns that event a provability no grated than g.
In particular, each forecaster must believe that a test cannot point out the other forecaster as correct. From her perspective, she is either preferred or the test is indecisive.
Consider a set of realizations assigned positive probability by one forecaster whereas her colleague assigns it a relatively small probability. We shall call a test 'reasonable' if the former forecaster assigns a positive probability to the event that the test will eventually provide a high propensity to her. Formally: Definition 4. We say that T is reasonable if for all f ∈ F × F, for all ε ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and for all measurable set A,
Intuitively this is the reverse requirement of the previous axiom -the probability ratio assigned to some set by the forecasters should be reflected in the results of the test. It should be emphasized that reasonableness and error-free are not related notions, examples that these properties are independent will be discussed in Section 5.
Remark 1. One could propose to replace error-freeness with a stronger and more appealing property in which a test points out the better informed expert. Informally, we would like to consider tests that have the following property f (T (ω, f ) = 1) = 1 whenever f = g. However, there could be pairs of forecasters that are not equal but induce the same probability distribution. In appendix A we formalize this and refer to tests that satisfy this stronger requirement as an ideal. We, furthermore show, as the name suggests, that such tests essentially do not exist.
An error-free and reasonable test
We now turn to propose an anonymous cardinal comparison test that is error-free and reasonable. For any pair of forecasters, f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F, ω ∈ Ω ∞ , t ≥ 0, the finite derivative test, , is defined as follows:
It should be noted that the ratio between t+1 (ω, f ), the rank associated with the forecast f , and 1 − t+1 (ω, f ), the rank associated with the forecast g, equals the likelihood ratio between the two forecasters.
Clearly, is anonymous. We turn to show it is reasonable and error-free. Before doing so, some preliminaries are required. Proof. For ω ∈ Ω ∞ with f (ω t ) > 0 define the likelihood ratio between the two forecasters at time t as
and observe that t+1 (ω, f ) =
. Applying Lemma 1 from (Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017) , we know is error-free.
2 ) and a measurable set A. From Lemma 1 the limit of t (ω, f ) exists and finite f − a.s. Hence,
Thus, applying ((Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017) , Lemma 2, part b) we obtain
Similarly, by applying ( (Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017) , Lemma 2, part a) we show that g(
, and hence is error-free.
Proposition 2.
is reasonable.
2 ) and a measurable set A, and suppose (w.l.o.g) that
Denote
,ε ) and observe that A = A 1 ∪ A 2 . Assume by contradiction that g(A 2 ) = 0 and notice that by the construction,
Thus, applying ((Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017) , Lemma 2, part a) together with g(A) = g(A 1 ) we obtain that
which contradicts (3) and hence g(A 2 ) > 0. By similar consideration, using the anonymity of , we show that f (A ∩ L f ,1−ε ) > 0 and therefore is reasonable.
3 Propositions 1 and 2 jointly prove our first main theorem:
is a anonymous, reasonable and error-free test.
We now turn to show that the finite derivative test is essentially the unique anonymous comparison that is reasonable and error-free.
Uniqueness
Although there may be other error-free and reasonable comparison tests they are essentially equivalent to the finite derivative test. To motivate this idea consider the following example.
Example 1. Consider the realizationω := (1, 1, 1, ...), and two forecasters f and g, both using a coin to make predictions. f uses a fair coin whereas g uses a biased coin with probability 1 for the outcome to be 1. Let − → h t 1 be the history of length t induced by (ω, f , g) and let ← − h t 1 be the one induced by (ω, g, f ). Let c > 1 and consider the following test:
Hence, the propensities of T are differ from those provided by only along the play paths − → h 1 , ← − h 1 , in which case the limit of T converges slower to 1, 0, respectively, than .
Claim. T is an anonymous error-free and a reasonable test.
Proof. Let f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F, ε ∈ (0, 1) and a measurable set A. Recall that f andω induce a unique play path, (ω, f ). Thus, if (ω, f ) = − → h 1 and (ω, f ) = ← − h 1 then by construction T (·, f ) ≡ (·, f ), and therefore T is error-free and reasonable as, by Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, is alike. 3 In fact we show a stronger result: since f is monotone and R
,ε it follows that, condition on f (A 2 ) > 0 there exists
On the other hand, let ε ∈ ( 1 2 , 1) and assume (w.l.o.g) that (ω, f ) = − → h 1 . Now, since is error-free and
,ε where g(ω) = 0 (as g induces a sequence of fair distributions alongω) we obtain
,ε ) = 0, as f (ω) = 1 by construction, and hence inequality (1) is satisfied trivially. As a consequence, T is error-free.
To see why T is reasonable let ε ∈ ( 1 2 , 1) and observe that, ifω ∈ A then the right hand side of condition (2) is satisfied triviality as f (A ∩ L f ,ε ) = 1. If, on the other hand,ω / ∈ A then, as before,
,ε , and hence condition (2) is satisfied since is reasonable. The proof for ε ∈ (0, 1 2 ) is analogous and hence omitted. Finally, by construction, the anonymity of implies the anonymity of T.
To capture the equivalency notion we introduce the following equivalence relation over tests;
We say that T ∼T if and only if T ∼ fT for all f .
That is, two tests are equivalent if and only if, given an ordered pair of forecasting strategies there is zero probability according to each forecaster that the tests will converge to different propensities.
Proposition 3. The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on ⊤ := {T : T − car d inal compar ison test}.
The proof of Proposition 3 is relegated to Appendix B. The next theorem asserts that, up to an equivalence class representative, there exists a unique anonymous reasonable and error-free test. That is, any anonymous test T ≁ T which is reasonable, admits an error. To this end, we will show that any T ≁ T can be associated with a pair of forecasting strategies for which the error-free condition fails. More importantly, the power of the theorem stems from the premise that T admits an error at any pair f whenever T ≁ f .
Before proceeding we make the observation that Definition 5 can be stated equivalently by the next lemma which is invoked in our adjacent uniqueness theorem proof.
The proof of Lemma 2 is supplemented to Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let T be anonymous and reasonable test. If T ≁ then T is not error-free.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that T is error-free. Let f := ( f , g) be such that T ≁ f , then from Lemma 2 there exits ε ∈ (0, 1) such that (w.
We shall consider the following cases which result in a contradiction. 
In addition, by the assumption T is reasonable hence
, and so there exists ε 2 < ε such that f (
0. By the assumption T is an error-free test, hence
In addition, by Proposition 2, is reasonable hence
. By the assumption T is an error-free test where, by Proposition 2, is reasonable; therefore, the contradiction
(as well as the case for which ε ∈ (0, 1 2 )) follows analogously from Case 1 and hence omitted.
Independence of axioms
The notions of error-free and reasonableness which were introduced in Section 2.2 are not related; obviously, the constant fair test, T t (ω, f ) ≡ 1/2, is error-free and is not reasonable as inequality (1) be the uniquely corresponding induced t -history. Consider the following test:
Claim. T is anonymous and reasonable but is not error-free.
Proof. Since is anonymous and
) and hence T is not error-free. To verify that T is a reasonable test note that the right hand side of condition (2) is satisfied forf regardless of ε asf ({ω}) =f ({ω} ∩ Lf T,ε ) = 1 (as well asg({ω}) =g({ω} ∩ Rf T,ε ) = 1 is satisfied for (g,f ) ). Consequently, since by Proposition 3, is a reasonable test the result follows.
(Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2008) introduce an alternative cardinal comparison test:
Note that this test differs from whenever the likelihood ratio is high(low) but finite. In our case the test does not decisively prefer any expert but yields a propensity which depends on the proportional ratio whereas the likelihood ratio test, L, does. Claim. L is anonymous and reasonable and is not error-free.
Proof. Let g be a forecasting strategy which deterministically predictsω, and let f be such that it predicts (1 − ε) at day one and meets g from day two onward regardless of any past history. Let 0 < ε < 1 and note that whenever f is assumed to be the true measure then L t (ω, f , g) = 1 1−ε > 1 for all t > 0 and so expert g is determinstically ranked by 1 along (ω, f ). A simple calculation shows that by takingε = 1−3ε 1−ε one has
as g(ω) = 1. Since ε is taken arbitrarily, not only L is not error-free but it admits an arbitrarily large error. The fact that L is reasonable follows directly from Proposition 3.
Decisiveness in finite time
In this section we provide a natural sufficient conditions for which a tester achieves a higher level of confidence in favor of the informed forecaster with any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time. To this end, we
show the existence of a uniform bound on the rate at which a test converges. Consider expert f ′ s point of view.
Not only should he maintain that, whenever expert g's forecasts are different from his than he should eventually be ranked higher then him, but if expert g's forecasts are sufficiently far than this should essentially happen uniformly fast. Indeed, as we show in this section, this holds for our finite derivative test. This observation tightly builds on a theory of active supermartingales due to (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992) .
To determine whether a test is 'almost' certain about a forecaster requires the two forecasters to provide significantly different forecasts as captured by the following definition:
Definition 6. A pair of forecasting strategies f :
The next theorem asserts that, given an arbitrarily small ε > 0, there exists a finite uniform bound, K, which is independent of any pair of forecasting strategies, such that if the forecasts of the uninformed experts are sufficiently differ from those of the informed one in more than K periods, then the finite derivative test, , will eventually settle on the informed expert with high level of confidence. In the later scenario, it furthermore surprisingly asserts that, given any sufficiently large time n, n ranks the informed expert more than (1 − ε) and up to ε -amount of accuracy as he would have ranked had he continued to rank the expert following his test to infinity.
Theorem 3. For all 0 < ε < 1 there exists K = K(ε) such that for all f := ( f , g), and for all n > 0, there is a set which probability according to f is at least (1 − ε) such that for any ω in that set:
In words, with high probability, given any sufficiently large n and any sufficiently small ε, the only reason that the tester is not 'almost' settled on the correct forecaster at finite time n is because the uninformed expert made excellent predictions along the play path. The power of the theorem stems from that fact that the bound on the number of times in which the two experts' forecasts must be differed, K, for the finite derivative test to rank the informed one higher, solely depends on the required level of accuracy, ε, and is independent of any pair of forecasting strategies, f .
The proof of Theorem 3 is relegated to Appendix B, nevertheless let us briefly provide some technical intuition. At the heart of the proof of Theorem 3 lies a theorem due to regarding the rate of decrease of active supermartingales. Consider an abstract setting with a probability measure P in ∆(Ω ∞ ) and a filtration {g t } ∞ t=1 .
Definition 7. An (g t ) -adapted, real-valued process˜ := {˜ t } ∞ t=0 is called a supermartingale under P if
Intuitively, a supermartingale is a process that decreases on average. The proof of Theorem 3 implies that the finite derivative test is associated, among others, with a supermartingale property with respect to the natural filtration which is defined in Section 2. Let us further consider the following class of supermartingales called active supermartingales. This notion has been first introduced in (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992) who study reputations in infinitely repeated games:
Definition 8. A non-negative supermartingale˜ is active with activity ψ ∈ (0, 1) under P if
In word, a supermartingale has activity ψ if the probability of a jump of size ψ at time t exceeds ψ for almost all histories. Note that˜ being a supermartingale, is weakly decreasing in expectations. Showing that it is active implies that˜ t substantially goes up or down relative to˜ t−1 with probability bounded away from zero in each period. (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992) , Theorem A.1, showed the following remarkable result. Fudenberg and Levine, 1992) ). For every ε > 0, ψ ∈ (0, 1), and
Theorem 4 ((
for every active supermartingale {˜ t } with˜ 0 ≡ 1 and activity ψ.
Theorem 4 asserts that if˜ is an active supermartingale with activity ψ then there is a fixed time K by which, with high probability,˜ t drops below D , and is otherwise independent of the underlying stochastic process P.
We exploit the active supermartingale property in a different way. In the context of comparison testing, we consider two strategies, one for each expert, which are updated using Bayes rule. Given sufficiently small ε > 0, our comparative test ranks an expert depending on whether the posterior odds ratio is above or below ε. The active supermartingale result implies that there is a uniform bound (independent of neither the length of the game nor the true distribution) on the number of periods where the uninformed expert can be substantially wrong without being detected, such that if this bound is exceeded, the probability that the tester ranks high the uninformed expert is small.
Concluding remarks
The paper proposes a normative approach to the challenge of comparing between two forecasters who repeatedly provide probabilistic forecasts. The paper postulates three basic norms: anonymity, error-freeness and reasonableness and provides a cardinal comparison test, the finite derivative test, that complies with them. It also shows that this test is essentially unique. Finally, due to a novel linkage with a class of supermartingales called actives, it shows that the test converges uniformly fast and hence is meaningful in finite time. In the future we hope to extend our results to settings with more than two forecasters and study alternative sets of norms.
Implications
The approach taken in this paper can be considered as a contribution to the hypothesis testing literature in statistics where a forecaster is associated with a hypothesis. In this context we propose a hypothesis test that complies with a set of fundamental properties which we refer to as axioms. In contrast, a central thrust for the hypothesis testing literature (for two hypotheses) is the pair of notions of significance level and power of a test.
In that literature one hypothesis is considered as the null hypothesis while the other serves as an alternative. A test is designed to either reject the null hypothesis, in which case it accepts the alternative, or fail to reject it (a binary outcome). The significance level of a test is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis whenever it is correct (type-1 error) while the power of the test is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis assuming the alternative one is correct (the complement of a type-2 error).
In contrast with the aforementioned binary outcome that is prevalent in the hypothesis testing literature we allow, in addition, for a wide variety of propensities outcomes. Recall the celebrated Neyman-Pearson lemma which characterizes a test with the maximal power subject to an upper bound on the significance level. The possibility of an inconclusive outcome, in our framework, allows us to design a test where both type-1 and type-2 errors can be reduced arbitrarily.
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Interestingly, the test proposed in the Neyman-Pearson lemma, similar to ours, also hinges on the likelihood ratio. 6 In our approach we, a priori, treat both hypotheses symmetrically. In the statistics literature, however, this is not the case and the null hypothesis is, in some sense, the status quo hypothesis. This asymmetry is manifested, for example, in the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
Note that in order to design a test that complies with a given significance level and a given power one must know the full specification of the two hypotheses. This is in contrast with our test which is universal, in the sense that it does not rely on the specifications of the two forecasts. Finally, let us comment that whereas hypothesis testing is primarily discussed in the context of a finite sample, typically from some iid distribution, our framework allows for sequences of forecasts that are dependent on past outcomes as well as past forecasts of the other expert. 5 Note that we abuse the statistical terminology. In statistics the notion of rejection is always used in the context of the null hypothesis.
In our model we assume symmetry between the alternatives and so we discuss rejection also in the context of the alternative hypothesis. As a consequence, an error of type-1 is defined as the probability of accepting the alternative hypothesis whenever the null hypothesis is correct, and symmetrically, an error of type-2 is the probability of accepting the null hypothesis whenever the alternative one is correct. 6 The test proposed in the Neyman-Pearson lemma rejects the null hypothesis whenever the likelihood ratio falls below some positive threshold.
APPENDIX A On ideal tests
Recall that an error-free test eliminates the necessity of pointing out the less informed expert. A stronger and more appealing property is to point out the better informed expert, in which case the tester eventually settles on one forecaster as being better than the other. We consider tests that exhibit such a property as ideal. Formally, Definition 9. T is decisive on f at (ω, f ) (respectively, g) if T t (ω, f ) −→ 1 (respectively, (1 − T t (ω, f )) −→ 1).
For a given T, f , we denote by 
It is called ideal if it is ideal with respect to F.
In other words, whenever the left expert knows the actual data generating process and right expert does not, an ideal test will surely identify the informed expert.
Trivially, any ideal test with respect to a subset of forecasts A is also error-free with respect to the same set. Notwithstanding, the converse does not follow. Whenever the measures induced by the two forecasters are mutually absolutely continuous, then an error-free test is not guaranteed to identify the better informed expert. Formally, On a set of realizations that has probability one according to forecaster f it is not necessarily the case that the test will identify him as better informed. 
